Equilibrium convergence in large games

Enxian Chen, Bin Wu and Hanping Xu

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2025, vol. 117, issue C

Abstract: This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of finite-player games, the limit of any convergent sequence of Nash equilibria of the corresponding finite-player games can be induced by a Nash equilibrium of the large game. Such a result goes beyond earlier results on the closed graph property for pure strategy Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games in multiple aspects. An application on equilibrium selection in large games is also presented.

Keywords: Large games; Finite-player games; Nash equilibrium; Closed graph property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C62 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:117:y:2025:i:c:s030440682500014x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103097

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