Monotonicity in Ultimatum Bargaining

Jack Robles

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2025, vol. 120, issue C

Abstract: We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020a) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence when the action space is discrete. Stronger assumptions are required when continuum demands are allowed.

Keywords: Games of incomplete information; Dynamic Bayesian games; Pure strategy equilibrium; Single crossing property; Bargaining; Ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:120:y:2025:i:c:s0304406825000710

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103154

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