Interaction sheaves on continuous domains

Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, vol. 45, issue 11, 708-719

Abstract: We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider game forms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding [Abdou, J., Keiding, H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 243-260].

Keywords: Nash; equilibrium; Strong; equilibrium; Solvability; Effectivity; Acyclicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2008)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:11:p:708-719

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