Large economies and two-player games

Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Emma Moreno-García

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, vol. 45, issue 9-10, 603-608

Abstract: We characterize the core and the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as strong Nash equilibria of an associated game with only two players.

Keywords: Competitive; equilibrium; Nash; equilibrium; Aubin; veto; Core-Walras; equivalence; Strong; Nash; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:9-10:p:603-608

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