Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization

Pavlo R. Blavatskyy

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, vol. 46, issue 2, 267-276

Abstract: In imperfectly discriminating contests the contestants contribute effort to win a prize but the highest contributed effort does not necessarily secure a win. The contest success function (CSF) is the technology that translates an individual's effort into his or her probability of winning. This paper provides an axiomatization of CSF when there is the possibility of a draw (the sum of winning probabilities across all contestants does not add up to one).

Keywords: Contest; success; function; Draw; Logit; Axiomatization; Irrelevant; alternatives; Homogeneity; Anonymity; Imperfectly; discriminating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:2:p:267-276

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