Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

Andreu Mas-Colell

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, vol. 46, issue 4, 382-383

Abstract: It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.

Keywords: Bimatrix; games; Generic; finiteness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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