Singular games in bv'NA

Abraham Neyman ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, vol. 46, issue 4, 384-387

Abstract: Every simple monotonic game in bv'NA is a weighted majority game. Every game v[set membership, variant]bv'NA has a representation where u[set membership, variant]pNA, [mu]i[set membership, variant]NA1 and fi is a sequence of bv' functions with . Moreover, the representation is unique if we require fi to be singular and that for every i[not equal to]j, [mu]i[not equal to][mu]j.

Keywords: Game; theory; Non-atomic; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Singular Games in bv'NA (2001)
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