Monotone comparative statics for games with strategic substitutes

Sunanda Roy and Tarun Sabarwal

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, vol. 46, issue 5, 793-806

Abstract: Under some conditions, parameterized games with strategic substitutes exhibit monotone comparative statics of equilibria. These conditions relate to a tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an opposing, indirect strategic substitute effect. If the indirect effect does not dominate the direct effect, monotone comparative statics of equilibria are guaranteed. These conditions are available for best-response functions, differentiable payoff functions, and general payoff functions. Results are extended to correspondences, the analysis applies to asymmetric equilibria, and several examples are provided.

Keywords: Monotone; comparative; statics; Nonincreasing; functions; Strategic; substitutes; Parameterized; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Monotone Comparative Statics for Games With Strategic Substitutes (2010)
Working Paper: Monotone Comparative Statics for Games With Strategic Substitutes (2009)
Working Paper: Monotone Comparative Statics for Games with Strategic Substitutes (2007)
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