Proper scoring rules with arbitrary value functions

Fang Fang, Maxwell Stinchcombe () and Andrew B. Whinston

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010, vol. 46, issue 6, 1200-1210

Abstract: Abstract A scoring rule is proper if it elicits an expert's true beliefs as a probabilistic forecast, and it is strictly proper if it uniquely elicits an expert's true beliefs. The value function associated with a (strictly) proper scoring rule is (strictly) convex on any convex set of beliefs. This paper gives conditions on compact sets of possible beliefs [Theta] that guarantee that every continuous value function on [Theta] is the value function associated with some strictly proper scoring rule. Compact subsets of many parametrized sets of distributions on satisfy these conditions.

Keywords: Expert; opinions; Elicitation; Proper; scoring; rules; Value; functions; Convex; extensions; of; functions; Bauer; simplexes; Choquet'; s; theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:6:p:1200-1210

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