Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

Pauline Contou-Carrère and Tristan Tomala

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 1, 14-21

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

Keywords: Finitely; repeated; games; Semi-standard; monitoring; Folk; Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Related works:
Working Paper: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2010)
Working Paper: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2010)
Working Paper: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:14-21

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