Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

Juan Moreno-Ternero

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 1, 29-36

Abstract: Abstract We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium.

Keywords: Voting; Taxes; Majority; Single-Crossing; Talmud (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2011)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2010)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2010)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:29-36

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