Equilibrium payoffs of finite games

Ehud Lehrer, Eilon Solan () and Yannick Viossat

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 1, 48-53

Abstract: Abstract We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash and correlated equilibria. In the two-player case, we obtain a full characterization: if U and P are subsets of , then there exists a bimatrix game whose sets of Nash and correlated equilibrium payoffs are, respectively, U and P, if and only if U is a finite union of rectangles, P is a polytope, and P contains U. The n-player case and the robustness of the result to perturbation of the payoff matrices are also studied. We show that arbitrarily close games may have arbitrarily different sets of equilibrium payoffs. All existence proofs are constructive.

Keywords: Equilibrium; payoffs; Correlated; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:48-53

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