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Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods

Serkan Küçükşenel ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 1, 72-76

Abstract: Abstract This paper shows that the core outcomes of the assignment game coincides with the set of fixed points of a certain function. The lattice property of the core, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem.

Keywords: Two-sided; matching; Assignment; game; Stability; Core; Lattice; structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:72-76