Generic impossibility of Arrow’s impossibility theorem

Mitsunori Noguchi

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 4-5, 391-400

Abstract: Our major objective is to show that if there are infinitely many alternatives and society can be decomposed into the sum of two non-negligible coalitions, the set of all Arrovian collective choice rules that satisfy the ultrafilter property (its set of decisive coalitions form an ultrafilter), is nowhere dense in the set of all Arrovian collective choice rules. This result entails that (1) almost all Arrovian collective choice rules are non-dictatorial and (2) in any neighborhood of a dictatorial Arrovian collective choice rule, a nondictatorial Arrovian collective choice rule can be found, i.e., the property of admitting a dictator is not a locally stable property for Arrovian collective choice rules in the sense that the property does not withstand a small perturbation.

Keywords: Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Social welfare function; Collective choice rule; Filter; Ultrafilter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:391-400

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.04.003

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