Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example

Jun Honda

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 6, 663-669

Abstract: This note studies the relationship between the global game and the generalized potential game approaches. We provide a non-degenerate example of a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game that has no monotone potential maximizer (MP-maximizer). Since the global-game solution for symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is independent of the noise distribution, this implies that MP-maximizer is not a necessary condition for global-game noise-independent selection.

Keywords: Equilibrium selection; Global games; Supermodular games; Potential games; Monotone potential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:663-669

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.005

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