Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection

Christian Basteck and Tijmen Daniëls

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, vol. 47, issue 6, 749-754

Abstract: We prove that the global game selection in all 3×3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independent of the noise structure. As far as we know, all other proofs of noise-independent selection in such games rely on the existence of a so-called monotone potential (MP) maximiser. Our result is more general, since some 3×3 symmetric supermodular games do not admit an MP maximiser. As a corollary, noise-independent selection does not imply the existence of an MP maximiser, nor the existence of an equilibrium robust to incomplete information.

Keywords: Global game; Noise-independent selection; Strategic complementarities; Supermodular game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:749-754

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.004

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