Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models

Jacco Thijssen, Kuno Huisman and Peter Kort

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2012, vol. 48, issue 4, 219-225

Abstract: This paper considers the problem of investment timing under uncertainty in a duopoly framework. When both firms want to be the first investor a coordination problem arises. Here, a method is proposed to deal with this coordination problem, involving the use of symmetric mixed strategies.

Keywords: Timing games; Real options; Preemption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (63)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game Theoretical Real Option Models (2002)
Working Paper: Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game Theoretical Real Option Models (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:48:y:2012:i:4:p:219-225

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.05.004

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