Variable-population voting rules

Marcus Pivato

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, vol. 49, issue 3, 210-221

Abstract: Let X be a set of social alternatives, and let V be a set of ‘votes’ or ‘signals’. (We do not assume any structure on X or V.) A variable population voting ruleF takes any number of anonymous votes drawn from V as input, and produces a nonempty subset of X as output. The rule F satisfies reinforcement if, whenever two disjoint sets of voters independently select some subset Y⊆X, the union of these two sets will also select Y. We show that F satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a balance rule. If F satisfies a form of neutrality, then F satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a scoring rule (with scores taking values in an abstract linearly ordered abelian group R); this generalizes a result of Myerson (1995).

Keywords: Voting; Reinforcement; Scoring rule; Ordered abelian group (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Variable-population voting rules (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:3:p:210-221

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.02.001

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