Bounded memory and permanent reputations
Daniel Monte ()
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, vol. 49, issue 5, 345-354
A recent result in repeated incomplete information games is that after an arbitrarily long history, any equilibrium of the continuation game must be an equilibrium of the complete information game. This result implies that reputation is a short-run phenomenon. We study a particular class of reputation games and show that bounded memory may lead to permanent reputations. In fact, for a particular range of parameters, a bounded memory player may never be able to learn anything at all.
Keywords: Bounded memory; Reputation games; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:5:p:345-354
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii
More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().