Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds

Duygu Yengin ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, vol. 49, issue 5, 389-397

Abstract: The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and k-fairness. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate an object efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating a collectively owned indivisible good or bad when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information.

Keywords: Welfare bounds; The identical-preferences lower-bound; Population monotonicity; Allocation of an indivisible good and money; The Groves mechanisms; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:5:p:389-397

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.05.005

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