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Kidney exchange: Further utilization of donors via listed exchange

Özgür Yılmaz ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, vol. 51, issue C, 178-186

Abstract: There is a set of incompatible patient–donor pairs and these pairs are matched pairwise. A match between two pairs corresponds to a paired kidney donation, where pairs exchange donated kidneys, or a paired listed exchange, where the first donor donates a kidney to the deceased donor wait-list, the first patient receives the kidney of the second donor, and the second patient receives a priority on the wait-list. We characterize the set of exchanges with the maximum number of transplants from the set of pairs. This characterization generalizes the well-known Gallai–Edmonds Decomposition Theorem.

Keywords: Kidney exchange; Gallai–Edmonds Decomposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:51:y:2014:i:c:p:178-186

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.09.007

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