Equality of opportunity and the alignment of incentives

Asen Ivanov ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, vol. 53, issue C, 16-25

Abstract: Under what conditions are the incentives of the members of society more aligned? We address this question in a setup in which individuals choose a policy without knowing who will benefit and who will be hurt by each policy. Our central result identifies a sufficient condition for a measure of disagreement in society, which has been linked to the equilibrium level of rent-seeking, to weakly decrease. This sufficient condition captures increasing equality of opportunity in a specific sense.

Keywords: Social choice; Social mobility; Equality of opportunity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:53:y:2014:i:c:p:16-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.05.003

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