A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes

Rodrigo Harrison and Pedro Jara-Moroni

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 57, issue C, 1-11

Abstract: Global games emerged as an approach to equilibrium selection. For a general setting with supermodular payoffs, unique selection of equilibrium has been obtained through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the case of global games with strategic substitutes, uniqueness of equilibrium has not been proved by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, making the equilibrium less appealing. In this work we provide a condition for dominance solvability in a simple three-player binary-action global game with strategic substitutes. This opens an unexplored research agenda on the study of global games with strategic substitutes.

Keywords: Global games; Equilibrium selection; Strategic substitutes; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406815000026
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:57:y:2015:i:c:p:1-11

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.01.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().