Cournot tatonnement and potentials

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 59, issue C, 117-127

Abstract: We study what topological assumptions should be added to the acyclicity of individual best response improvements in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium in a strategic game, as well as the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in the limit of a best response improvement path.

Keywords: Cournot tatonnement; Cournot potential; Game with structured utilities; Aggregative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Cournot tatonnement and potentials (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:117-127

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.005

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