Full implementation in backward induction

Yi-Chun Chen and Yifei Sun

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 59, issue C, 71-76

Abstract: In a complete-information environment with two or more players and a finite type space, we show that any truthfully implementable social choice function can be fully implemented in backward induction via a finite perfect-information stochastic mechanism with arbitrarily small transfers.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406815000506
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:71-76

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.05.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().