On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist

Domenico Menicucci, Sjaak Hurkens and Doh-Shin Jeon

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 60, issue C, 33-42

Abstract: This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if the virtual valuation for each object is non-negative for all possible types, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle. Under an additional regularity condition, pure bundling is the optimal sale mechanism among all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms.

Keywords: Monopoly pricing; Price discrimination; Multi-dimensional mechanism design; Pure bundling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440681500066X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:33-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.011

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().