Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining

Bram Driesen (), Michele Lombardi and Hans Peters

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2016, vol. 67, issue C, 162-170

Abstract: We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different assumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse.

Keywords: Subjective expected utility; Choquet expected utility; Comparative risk aversion; Comparative uncertainty aversion; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:67:y:2016:i:c:p:162-170

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.003

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