The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty

Tibor Németh and Miklós Pintér

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 69, issue C, 1-6

Abstract: The weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty (Habis and Herings, 2011) is considered. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the weak sequential core. We show that a transferable utility game with uncertainty has a non-empty weak sequential core if and only if it is uniformly P-balanced on the cores.

Keywords: Transferable utility game with uncertainty; Weak sequential core; Uniform P-balancedness on the cores; Generalized balanced game with universal veto control; Universally balancedness on the cores; Non-transferable utility cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:69:y:2017:i:c:p:1-6

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.002

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