A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
Yasunori Okumura ()
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 72, issue C, 104-111
This study discusses a one-sided many-to-many matching model wherein agents may not be divided into two disjoint sets. Moreover, each agent is allowed to have multiple partnerships in our model. We restrict our attention to the case where the preference of each agent is single-peaked over: (i) the total number of partnerships with all other agents, and (ii) the number of partnerships that the agent has with each of the other agents. We represent a matching as a multigraph, and characterize a matching that is stable and constrained efficient. Finally, we show that any direct mechanism for selecting a stable and constrained efficient matching is not strategy-proof.
Keywords: Matching; Market design; Maximum c-matching; Network formation; Strategy-proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:104-111
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