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Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers

Martin Van der Linden

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, vol. 73, issue C, 111-121

Abstract: When a group of voters selects a committee out of a set of candidates, it is common and often desirable to endow these voters with some veto power. I present impossibility results showing that even limited veto power makes many mechanisms of interest manipulable. This applies in particular (i) to mechanisms the range of which contains a degenerate lottery in which a committee is chosen for sure and (ii) to mechanisms that are constructed from extensive game forms with a finite number of strategies. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences, and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed and voters can report cardinal preferences.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Strategy-proofness; Veto; Probabilistic mechanism; Committee selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes (2016) Downloads
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