Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 74, issue C, 68-78

Abstract: Philip Reny’s approach to games with discontinuous utility functions can work outside its original context. The existence of Nash equilibrium and the possibility to approach the equilibrium set with a finite number of individual improvements are established, under conditions weaker than the better reply security, for three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strategic complements, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions.

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Potential game; Bertrand competition; Strategic complements; Aggregative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:74:y:2018:i:c:p:68-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.005

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