Procedurally fair implementation under complete information

Ville Korpela

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 77, issue C, 25-31

Abstract: We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin (1999), and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.

Keywords: Characterization; Implementation; Nash equilibrium; Ex ante fairness; Ex post fairness; Symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:77:y:2018:i:c:p:25-31

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001

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