Strategic vote trading under complete information
Dimitrios Xefteris and
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, vol. 78, issue C, 52-58
We study two-party elections considering that: (a) prior to the voting stage voters are free to trade votes for money according to the rules of the Shapley–Shubik strategic market games; and (b) voters’ preferences – both ordinal rankings and cardinal intensities – arepublic information. While under plurality rule no trade occurs, under a power-sharing system (voters’ utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party) full trade is always an equilibrium (two voters – the strongest supporter of each party – buy the votes of all others). Notably, this equilibrium implements proportional justice with respect to the two buyers: the ratio of the parties’ vote shares is equal to the ratio of the preference intensities of the two most opposing voters.
Keywords: Vote trading; Complete information; Strategic market games; Power sharing; Proportional justice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Strategic vote trading under complete information (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:78:y:2018:i:c:p:52-58
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