Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games

Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena and Peter Sudhölter

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021, vol. 95, issue C

Abstract: We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing “poorest” by “poorer” allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, we show that the egalitarian solution is characterized by constrained welfare egalitarianism and either bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler or, together with individual rationality, by bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell.

Keywords: Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution; Axiomatizations; Aggregate monotonicity; Convex TU game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440682100015X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:95:y:2021:i:c:s030440682100015x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102477

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().