Economics at your fingertips  

On the implementation of the median

Matias Nuñez, Carlos Pimienta and Dimitrios Xefteris

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2022, vol. 99, issue C

Abstract: In the single-peaked domain, the median rule is strategy-proof but not implementable in (Bayes–)Nash equilibrium by its associated direct mechanism. We define the value-based median mechanism that implements the median rule in (Bayes–)Nash equilibrium in the single-peaked domain under complete and incomplete information. Such a mechanism selects the median of the profile of different values announced by the agents (i.e., ignoring redundant announcements). The value-based median does not depend on agents’ beliefs (in line with robust mechanism design). In the case of incomplete information, it induces truthful revelation of preferences (in line with strategy-proofness) for almost all peaks. We present extensions of our results to generalized median rules and finite policy spaces and their limitations.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Bayesian implementation; Robust implementation; Median rule; Strategy-proofness; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102595

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2023-01-21
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:99:y:2022:i:c:s030440682100152x