The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs

Florian Navarro

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 105, issue C, 1-13

Abstract: A cooperative game with transferable utility is a situation in which players can generate worth by cooperating and obtain a certain payoff via a sharing rule. In this paper we assume that the cooperation between players is restricted by an acyclic graph. We introduce new sharing rule for this type of game. We also offer an axiomatization of this sharing rule, based mainly on linearity and a consistency axiom. For unanimity games, this sharing rule identifies the center of the graph.

Keywords: Game theory; Cooperative games; Graphs; Associated consistency; Centrality measures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489620300172
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:105:y:2020:i:c:p:1-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.02.001

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().