The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs

Florian Navarro

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Abstract: A cooperative game with transferable utility is a situation in which players can generate worth by cooperating and obtain a certain payoff via a sharing rule. In this paper we assume that the cooperation between players is restricted by an acyclic graph. We introduce a new sharing rule for this type of game. We also offer an axiomatization of this sharing rule, based mainly on linearity and a consistency axiom. For unanimity games, this sharing rule identifies the center of the graph.

Keywords: game theory; cooperative games; graphs; associated consistency; centrality measures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03411527v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, 105, pp.1-13. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.02.001⟩

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Journal Article: The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03411527

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.02.001

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