Strictly strategy-proof auctions

Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, vol. 107, issue C, 13-16

Abstract: A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is ‘essentially for free’.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Auction; Strategy-proof; Dominant strategy; Robustness; Virtual (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:107:y:2020:i:c:p:13-16

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.07.002

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