Strictly strategy-proof auctions

Matteo Escud\'e and Ludvig Sinander
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Matteo Escudé

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'.

Date: 2018-07, Revised 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 107, 13-16 (2020)

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Journal Article: Strictly strategy-proof auctions (2020)
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