On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings

Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 110, issue C, 1-13

Abstract: For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and q-responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of stable matchings. We also prove that a strongly stable fractional matching is represented by a lottery of stable matchings that are ordered in the common preferences of all firms.

Keywords: Matching markets; Many-to-one matching market; Strongly stable fractional matchings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:110:y:2021:i:c:p:1-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.12.002

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