On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings

Pablo Neme and Jorge Oviedo

No 19, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and q-responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional match- ings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of stable matchings. We also prove that a strongly stable fractional matching is represented as a convex combination of stable matchings that are ordered in the common preferences of all firms.

Keywords: Matching; Markets; Many-to-one; Matching; Market; Strongly; Stable; Fractional; Matchings; Linear; Programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Journal Article: On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:19

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