Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible

Mehdi Ayouni, Tim Friehe and Yannick Gabuthy

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 121, issue C, 26-35

Abstract: This paper analyzes how mandated information disclosure prior to settlement negotiations influences equilibrium outcomes when the privately informed party may misrepresent its type at a cost. We establish that private information cannot be fully revealed and that a regime without information sharing may outperform a regime with information sharing according to the criteria of expected social costs and fairness considerations.

Keywords: Litigation; Information disclosure; Discovery; Misreporting; Pre-trial settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:121:y:2023:i:c:p:26-35

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.12.001

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