Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible

Mehdi Ayouni (), Tim Friehe and Yannick Gabuthy ()
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Mehdi Ayouni: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Yannick Gabuthy: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: This paper analyzes how mandated information disclosure prior to settlement negotiations influences equilibrium outcomes when the privately informed party may misrepresent its type at a cost. We establish that private information cannot be fully revealed and that a regime without information sharing may outperform a regime with information sharing according to the criteria of expected social costs and fairness considerations.

Keywords: Litigation; Information disclosure; Discovery; Misreporting; Pre-trial settlement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, 121, pp.26-35. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.12.001⟩

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Journal Article: Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03987359

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.12.001

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