Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments

Alex Krumer, Reut Megidish and Aner Sela

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 122, issue C, 50-57

Abstract: We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.

Keywords: Multi-stage contests; All-pay auctions; Round-robin tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:122:y:2023:i:c:p:50-57

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.02.002

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