Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments
Alex Krumer (),
Reut Megidish and
No 14412, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.
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