Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result
Tommy Andersson and
Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, issue C, 1-5
Abstract:
This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.
Keywords: Characterization; House allocation; Strategy-proofness; Multi-object auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects: A Characterization Result (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:128:y:2024:i:c:p:1-5
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.12.004
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