Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects: A Characterization Result

Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson ()
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Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden, http://portal.research.lu.se/portal/sv/persons/larsgunnar-svensson(fed27689-e2b8-418d-850c-ba6d23a5138d).html

No 2018:21, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.

Keywords: Characterization; House allocation; Strategy-proofness; Multi-object auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D63 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2018-09-03, Revised 2023-05-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2018_021

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