On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining

Anders Poulsen ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, vol. 47, issue 2, 233-243

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: On Efficiency, Tie Breaking Rules and Role Assignment Procedures in Evolutionary Bargaining (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:233-243

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