Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

Yannick Viossat

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, vol. 56, issue 1, 27-43

Abstract: We show on a 4×4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.

Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria (2008)
Working Paper: Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium (2006)
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