Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria

Yannick Viossat

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Abstract: We show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Evolutionary dynamics; Elimination; As-if rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00360756v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 56 (1), pp.27-43. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00360756

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001

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